

C3S	CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>	FOR USE BY ORIGINATOR
THRU:		FOR USE BY ODJS ONLY
		DJSM NO
		DJSM DATE
		ACTION
		APPROVAL
		SIGNATURE
SUBJECT: Notes On: WINTEX 83 Senior Level First Impressions Conference, 22 Mar 83 (U)		X INFORMATION

- Accompanying MFR with attachment's responds to your request\*:  
 "Would like to have a simple list of each comm deficiency identified and short analysis of where sytems improvements (possibly would affect each)stands at the moment."
- Four issues are addressed, as follows:
  - #1: NATO - US Secure Voice
  - #2: Data File Transfer using WWMCCS ADP
  - #3: US - NATO Communications
  - #4: European Theater Communications
- Upon removal of attachments, this summary sheet is UNCLASSIFIED.

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 Authority: EO 13526  
 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
 Date: DEC 14 2012

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5USC§552  
 Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
 Date: 14 DEC 2012 Authority: EO 13526  
 Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Declassify in Part: X  
 Reason: 3.3(b)(5), (b)(7) + 5USC§552(b)(6)  
 MDR: 12-M-1493

**Attachments**

- \* Summary Sheet, 23 Mar 83
- MFR - Notes On: WINTEX 83, 12 Apr 83

JS 5U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)

ACTION OFFICER	COORDINATION/APPROVAL					
	OFFICE	NAME & DATE	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME & DATE	EXTENSION
COL, USA EVAL OFC X57155	EVAL	[REDACTED]				
	C3S EXEC					
	TC3S	CY PROVIDED				
	SC3S	CY PROVIDED				
	DATE OF PREPARATION Apr 83	CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>			12-M-1493	(#1)

508-8-15

# OJCS SUMMARY SHEET

C3S	CLASSIFICATION <del>SECRET</del> <b>SECRET</b>	FOR USE BY ORIGINATOR
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SUBJECT: Notes on: WINTEX 83 Senior Level First Impressions Conference, 22 Mar 1983 (U)	APPROVAL	
	SIGNATURE	
	X INFORMATION	

1. Accompanying MFR highlights OJCS briefing and senior officer comments made at the First Impressions Conference. Briefing and briefing slides are attached.
2. Upon removal of attachments, this Summary Sheet is UNCLASSIFIED.


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— Would like to have a single list of each comm deficiency identified and short analysis of where system improvements (that would affect each) stands at the moment.

Attachment

JS 5 usc § 552(b)(6)

ACTION OFFICER	COORDINATION/APPROVAL					
	OFFICE	NAME & DATE	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME & DATE	EXTENSION
COL, USA C3S EVAL OFFICE X57155/jjb	EVAL	[REDACTED]				
	C3S EX	[REDACTED]				
	TC3S	[REDACTED]				
	SC3S	CY PROVIDED				
DATE OF PREPARATION 23 March 1983	CLASSIFICATION <del>SECRET</del> <b>SECRET</b>					



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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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Date: DEC 14 2012


THE JOINT STAFF

22 March 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Notes on WINTEX 83 Senior Level First Impressions  
Conference, 22 March 1983

LTG Prillaman - Key note - had a good exercise overall  
- Will focus on negative rather than positive

 - briefer JS 5 USC 552(b)(6)

- Controller First Impressions

(1) JDA

-- OPLAN data bases outdated

(2) Execution Monitoring

-- Matching US/NATO Rules of Engagement not smooth

(3) OPLAN assignment errors made

(4) Alert System - not fully known by all

(5) Situation Monitoring


(6) Selective Release

-- NATO secure voice not reliable

-- AUTOSEVOCOM limited

JS 3.3(b)(8)

  
-- Examination of procedures need to be made

  
-- Trend for improvement is insufficient

(7) Crises Management

-- Procedures need to be refined...OSD/JCS are  
improving

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- Time differences brought problems. Need full 24 hour participation
  - Declaration of war only on ORANGE rather than all ORANGE Pact...confused allies
  - Trend is insufficient
- (8) NEO
- Evacuation smooth
  - Lack of transit/safe haven agreements are in existence...need coordination
- (9) Security Assistance
- Reallocation/legislation coordination needs to be improved...standby legislation needs to be made
- (10) Log Sustainability (Civil-Military)
- Inadequate...needs fixing
- (11) WWMCCS ADP
- WIN reliability: 95%
  - Data base transfer problem: Master Force List transfer by JDS - 50 hours
- (12) Space Operations
- Lots of play
  - Passing of control satisfactory
- (13) Communications
- Actual degradations occurred
  - Minimize effected
  - Messages backlogged and had to be flown between command centers
  - OPSEC weakness
  - Trend is poor

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Exercise Chief Controller (BG Penzler)

- Major Concern
  - Comms to NATO
  - Players not looking ahead
  - Exercise not used as training vehicle by STATE/OSD
- Major Progress
  - Better decentralization
  - More participants
  - Good test of NATO plans/procedures

Fall 1983 exercise (November) will be PRESSURE POINT 84

LTG Prillaman - Senior Player Comments

DEPSECDEF (Thayer) - We need player participation here in Washington to help improve crisis management...try to get higher level players more involved...need high level attention

OSD (Gen Stillwell) - Bringing a coalition from crisis to war is demanding. We must continue to practice these exercises...some activities provided a new man each day...this is a poor way to learn. State Department participation was quite inadequate...a noticeable lack of high level STATE play...especially you Mr. Ambassador. We are going to propose a Working Group of Exercise Planners for the next exercise (high level planners)... we are still in a reactive mode...we need active advanced planning involved

STATE (Ambassador Landgen) - Well...I was out of town. The criticism is justified...I feel strongly that we are generally deficient in terms of games and exercises. We will improve!...am surprised that we have no agreements in advance on NEO...surprised we had no evacuation by sea...surprised by need for more secure comms... generally surprised by our needs...STATE must become involved...

WHITE HOUSE (Gen Boverie)

- Admin problem in declaring war on ORANGE rather than ORANGE "Pact" is our mistake...we'll become more alert

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- Secure video link between Pentagon and White House is a problem...understand work is underway

FEMA (Mr. Guifferra)

- Was distressed that OPSEC/COMSEC went down on this exercise
- Message addressed to wrong places...activities needing to respond not addressed...activities not needing to respond were addressed...some of these actually responded
- Want to be informed on use of NUCS...only as an info addressee...we need to keep abreast of what's happening
- We need higher level participation so that the problems can be addressed

SEC ARMY (Secretary March)

- Need for secure communications is apparent
- If Soviet Union was to intercept our comms, I'm quite sure they would be confused, however...

ARMY (MG O'Conner)

- Can't see a swing strategy - war will be all over

VCNO (Adm Small)

- War must be seen as a global war

DEPT AIR FORCE (Secretary McCoy)

- Need more senior players involved
- Need better coordination with Joint Staff in crisis management
- Need better information on which to base decisions

AIR FORCE (MG Burpie)

MARINE CORPS (LTG \_\_\_\_\_)

- I'll keep quiet

COAST GUARD (VAdm Stebbie)

- Look forward to next exercise

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NORAD (BG Brandt)

- Excellent exercise

CINCCENT

- No comment at this time

JCS (J-4)

- Exercise artificialities caused problems
- We'll look at sustainability more closely

(J-5) - No comment

(C3S) - No comment


MSC (Vadm Carrol)

- We need to test our sea attrition in war...we're fooling ourselves if we think we can get it all there without losses...this frightens me...in 1942, we sent 33 ships to Mummansk - only 11 got through
- We need to look at sealift attrition because 95% of our goods go by sea

JCS (LTG Dalton)


- The people who should have played in the exercise should have been the people with the expertise
- OPSEC - We're not disciplined and we don't have enough secure lines
- We need to educate people in understanding NATO procedures
- Express appreciation to all who did participate
  - Again, we're focusing on the negative today
- Thanks

JS 5 USC 3552(b)(6)



Colonel, US Army  
C3S Evaluation Office

DEC 14 2012




FIRST IMPRESSIONS

CINCAD/NORAD

- WIN ACCESS FOR FIRST TIME PERMITTED TELECONFERENCING WITH JDA, MTMC AND MAC
- COMMAND CENTER RECEIVED EXCELLENT PLAY FROM NEW SPACE AND AIR ACTIVITY CONFERENCES
- IMPLEMENTATION OF OPLANS/CONPLANS REALISTICALLY EXERCISED PROCEDURES AND HIGHLIGHTED:
  - SHORTAGE OF AIR TO AIR MUNITIONS
  - LACK OF ADEQUATE ADA/E-3A/FIGHTER RESOURCES
- NUCLEAR WEAPONS RELEASE PROCEDURES WERE COMPLETE AND WELL PLAYED
- ✓ ○ EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS RESTORAL PROCEDURES SHOULD REMAIN A MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF JCS EXERCISES








CHIEF CONTROLLER COMMENTS

MAJOR CONCERNS

- ✓ ○ SECURE COMMUNICATIONS TO NATO
- PLAYERS REACTED TO CURRENT SITUATION WITHOUT LOOKING AHEAD
- EXERCISE NOT USED BY STATE DEPARTMENT AND SENIOR OFFICIALS AS A TRAINING VEHICLE
- PROCEDURES ASSOCIATED WITH THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
- EXERCISE TOO LONG AND INFLEXIBLE






FIRST IMPRESSIONS  
CINCPAC

- ✓ EUROPEAN THEATER COMMUNICATIONS INADEQUATE TO SUPPORT INTRATHEATER LIFT
  - SLOW
  - NOT SECURE
  - INSUFFICIENT
- ADHERENCE TO AIRLIFT PROCEDURES IMPROVED GREATLY
- SHORT NOTICE JOBS EXECUTE ORDERS RESTRICT TIMELY SCHEDULING OF MISSIONS
- MISUNDERSTANDING EXISTS IN DEPLOYMENT COMMUNITY OVER ACQUISITION OF NATO AND U.S. CIVILIAN AIRLIFT ASSETS
- CLOSURE ESTIMATING DIFFICULT WHEN AIRLIFT ALLOCATION IS UNCERTAIN OR SIZE OF FORCE IS UNKNOWN

W083-07a on Disk Misc C

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HAND IMPRESSIONS

COMMUNICATIONS

- o U.S. NATO COMMUNICATIONS
  - o SOME IMPACT FROM DEGRADES
  - o INADEQUATE NATO SYSTEMS
- o OPSEC WEAKNESSES

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TREND ANALYSIS

WINTEX-CIMEX ADP

	1979	1981	1983
	POWER PLAY	POLL STATION	WINTEX- CIMEX
○ HARDWARE & SOFTWARE RELIABILITY	RED	RED	GREEN
○ DATA FILE TRANSFER	RED	RED	YELLOW
○ WIN TELECONFERENCING	YELLOW	YELLOW	GREEN

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TREND ANALYSIS

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

	1979 POWER PLAY	1981 POLL STATION	1983 WINTEX- CIMEX
○ NATO-U.S. SECURE VOICE	RED	RED.	RED
○ OJCS CRISIS ACTION TEAM PROCEDURES	YELLOW	YELLOW	YELLOW
○ OSD — OJCS COORDINATION	RED	RED	GREEN
○ TIME DIFFERENCES	—	—	—
○ STATE DEPARTMENT PARTICIPATION	RED	RED	RED
○ DECLARATION OF WAR	—	RED	RED

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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Date: DEC 14 2012

12 April 1983

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Notes On: WINTEX 83 Senior Level First Impressions Conference, 22 Mar 83 (U)

1. (U) This MFR highlights four issues addressed at the 22 Mar 83 First Impressions Conference. These issues are documented to respond to the following Dir, C3S, request:

"Would like to have a simple list of each comm deficiency identified and short analysis of where systems improvements (possibly would affect each) stands at the moment."

2. (U) The Issues:

(U) #1: NATO - US Secure Voice.

(1) ~~(S)~~ First Impression: Was Inadequate

(2) ~~(S)~~ Status of Improvement: ELCROVOX is the Normal NATO Secure Voice Equipment. It operates at data rates between 1.8 to 2.4 kbps and thus compares with our 2.4 kbps narrow-band service as far as quality is concerned. There is, however, no interface with US secure voice equipment because of the different algorithms and technology used. Cross-connecting the systems requires breaking back to clear voice and reencrypting with a loss in quality. The US has proposed a loan of up to 360 STU II until a NATO standard is approved and purchased. A decision on this loan offer is expected to be made in 3 to 4 months. The loan offer will likely be rejected because of competing European member secure voice programs. The Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Italy, and France all have bilateral agreements with the US to build STU compatible secure voice equipment.

(U) #2: Data File Transfer Using WWMCCS ADP.

(1) ~~(S)~~ First Impression: Was Inadequate

(2) ~~(S)~~ Status of Improvement: This is misleading, because it leads one to believe that WWMCCS ADP, per se, is the culprit in any inadequacies associated with data file transfer. It was instead, a series of user errors that included

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a receiving file too small and an inadvertent erasure of files which caused a 50 - hour delay. WWMCCS ADP itself, during this period, functioned adequately. Consequently, no WWMCCS ADP "improvement" is required. In addition, an ancillary problem was the transfer of a USPACOM package from the JDA to the NMCC. An exercise file had not been prepared at USPACOM and JDA. Resultant preparation of a file required a 2 to 3 day effort. In sum, no hardware systems problem here; rather, it was a procedures problem. (Procedures are being reviewed by various commands to prevent such errors in the future.)

(U) #3: US - NATO Communications.

(1) ~~(S)~~ First Impression: Were Inadequate

(2) ~~(S)~~ Status of Improvement. A principal reason is that US 1200 Baud systems interfaced with NATO 75 Baud systems and the NATO systems could not maintain pace. Attached point papers and memo (Tabs A, B, and C) cite the following:

-- Tab A: To partially alleviate the backlogs, USCINCEUR installed 1200 Baud equipment and delivered messages by courier. An interim solution has been suggested that would pre-position high-speed terminals and send additional AUTODIN to NATO.

-- Tab B: 48% of messages manually input into the teletype circuit at the Pentagon were rejected by the Belgium TARE. US delegate to the Military Committee at Brussels has recommended that US personnel visit NATO to analyze the reject problem.

-- Tab C: NATO interoperability is hindered by the need for data security. NATO cannot dictate standards. Major initiatives are being addressed, however, that involve interoperability. These are: the encouragement of standards in equipment, procedures, integration, and compatibility; the cooperation in development and procurement; and, the recommended adoption of common applications.

(U) #4: European Theater Communications.


(1) ~~(S)~~ First Impression: Were Inadequate

(2) ~~(S)~~ Status of Improvement. A CINCMAC representative made this observation in relation to several related problems as follows:

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- slow comms: Pertained to the AUTODIN switch badklog in Europe between USEUCOM and NATO HQs (which by the 11th & 12th days of the CPX registered message backlogs in terms of not "hours," but "days;" e.g. 8+ days at AFNORTH, 6+ days at UKAIR, and 3+ days at AFCENT. Such required the transit of US - NATO messages by aircraft and vehicular courier (see para c, Tab A, above).
- unsecure comms: Pertained to shortages in PARKHILL equipment within USAFE to satisfy MAC requirements and a lack of NATO compatible secure voice equipment.
- insufficient comms: Pertained to insufficient Class A AUTOVON access lines needed to support the CINCMAC - ALCE traffic. The basic problem is based on a general shortage of USAF funds that are needed for leasing lines for ALCE operations.

Improvements center on a long standing problem facing CINCMAC involving exercises. This generally lies in the purview of the USAF to resolve funding issues. The SVIP/ALCEP/STU II programs may provide for long term relief; however, near term actions will require providing more PARKHILL and VINSON to meet needs. Some relief on the AUTODIN/AUTOVON saturation problem may be afforded on completion of the Digital European Backbone (DEB) and the European Telephone System (DTS) upgrades and the eventual evolution to the Defense Data Network (DDN). The problem of AUTOVON access will require USAFE assigning sufficiently high priority to the CINCMAC needs to insure that funds are available for leasing of required circuits. (In the past, these requirements have been deleted due to funding shortages.)



COL, USA  
EVAL OFC

3 Incls

- A - Point Paper "NATO Comms Backlogs," 21 Mar 83
- B - Point paper "Message Rejection," 21 Mar 83
- C- Memo "WINTEX 83," 5 Apr 83

JS 5 USC § 552 (b)(6)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



21 March 1983

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Point Paper for the Director for Operations for use during the SHAPE Post Exercise Discussion (PXD)

I. SUBJECT: NATO Communications Backlogs (U)

II. PURPOSE: To provide background information on AUTODIN backlogs which occurred during WINTEX-CIMEX 83.

III. MAJOR POINTS:

A. During WINTEX-CIMEX 83, backlogs occurred at the interface points between high-speed AUTODIN and low-speed NATO systems.

B. Backlogs occurred at all the AUTODIN switches, but the most serious was at Croughton, UK.

- Most NATO circuits operate at 75 baud; thus, they are unable to accept large volumes of message traffic from the AUTODIN system.

- Peak backlogs were traffic for:

-- Southwick, UK	791 messages
-- Kolsass, NE	2069 messages
-- Northwood, UK	1661 messages
-- Maastricht, NE	624 messages

C. To partially alleviate the backlog, USCINCEUR installed 1200 baud Digital Subscriber Terminal Equipment (DSTE) at Ramstein AB and delivered messages by courier.

D. USCINCEUR has proposed the following interim solution (Tab A):

- Preposition high-speed mobile terminal equipment at specified locations within theater.

- Additional AUTODIN to NATO

JS 5 use § 552 (b) (6)

APPROVED BY

DIRECTOR, C3S

Prepared by:

Contingency/Crisis Management Division, C3S  
Extension 70007  
17 March 1983

ATTACHMENT

TAB A - USCINCEUR 131030Z MAR 83

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Date: DEC 14 2012

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

IMMEDIATE

O 131030Z MAR 83

FM USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY//ECJ3//

TO JCS WASH DC//J3/J4/J1/JED//

INFO CINCSAREUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY//AEAGC//

CINCSNAVEUR LONDON UNITED KINGDOM

CINCSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GERMANY//DD//

USAFR SHAPE BELGIUM

ZYUW RUSKHOA0403 072105Z

JS 3.3(b)(5)

CINCLANT NORFOLK VA

SECTION 001 OF 002

SUBJ: FIRST IMPRESSIONS REPORT: EXERCISE WINTEX-CIMEX 83 (U)  
REF: JCS O21840Z FEB 83 (U) NOTAL

1. (U) IN RESPONSE TO REF FOLLOWUP COMMENTS ARE PROVIDED.

2. (U) GENERAL COMMENT: WINTEX-CIMEX 83 WAS ONE OF BEST EXERCISES CONDUCTED IN RECENT YEARS FROM TRAINING PERSPECTIVE. EXERCISE ALLOWED MAJOR HEADQUARTERS BATTLE STAFFS TIME TO CONSIDER AND STAFF ISSUES PROPERLY AND TO TRAIN IN PROCEDURES NOT PRACTICED DURING DAILY OPERATIONS.

(U) MANY REAL WORLD PROBLEMS WERE HIGHLIGHTED, SOME WERE IMMEDIATELY RESOLVED, OTHERS, SOME OF WHICH ARE STATED BELOW OR WILL BE ADDRESSED IN AFTER ACTION REPORT, STILL REQUIRE ATTENTION.

3. (U) SPECIFIC IMPRESSIONS ARRANGED AS REQUESTED IN REF, NOT INDICATIVE OF RELATIVE IMPORTANCE.

A. (U) JOINT DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM:

(1) (U) TRACKING HIGH PRIORITY CARGO: AFTER PLAN EXECUTION, ASSIGNMENT OF NON-UNIT CARGO PRIORITIES TO MOVE BY AIR IN TFFD FLOW IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. CARGO INCREMENT NUMBERS (CIN) REPRESENT NOTIONAL VICE ACTUAL CARGO AND ARE USELESS TO CINC FOR MANAGING HIGH PRIORITY CARGO. USE OF CARGO NUMBER (CGO) WITH DATA ELEMENTS SIMILAR TO FRN WOULD SOLVE THIS PROBLEM.

B. (U) COMMAND CENTER OPERATIONS, PROCEDURES, COMMUNICATIONS AND OSD, JCS, CINC, AGENCY INTERFACE.

(1) (U) LOGISTICS ASSISTANCE REQUESTS: LOGISTICS ASSISTANCE REQUESTS FROM NATIONS ARE PROCESSED THROUGH SHAPE LOGISTICS COORDINATION CELL TO NATIONAL MOOS, HQ USEUCOM, AND SERVICE COMPONENTS. IF REQUESTED ITEM IS SURPLUS IN THEATER, RESPONSE IS TIMELY; IF ITEM NOT SURPLUS, JCS SENDS REQUIREMENTS TO SERVICES FOR SCREENING, WHERE SEEMINGLY INEFFECTIVE TIME PASSES WITH NO RESPONSE. THIS CAUSED UNCLE FRUSTRATION FOR REQUESTING NATION AND CRIPPLES NATO COMMANDER'S EFFORTS TO PLAN FOR EMPLOYING AND SUSTAINING HIS FORCE. RECOMMEND LOGISTIC ASSISTANCE REQUEST PROCEDURES BE REVISED TO PROVIDE TIMELY RESPONSE.

(2) (U) MAJOR NATO COMMAND PRIORITIES: CONFLICTS IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION AMONG MAJOR NATO COMMANDS (SACLANT, SACEUR, AND CINCPAC) HAD NO CLEAR STANDARD FOR RESOLUTION. CONFLICTS IN REPLACEMENT REQUESTS FOR U.S. SHIPS LOST IN SACEUR'S MEDITERRANEAN OR SACLANT'S NORTH SEA WERE RESOLVED ON UNILATERAL BASIS BY JCS WITH NO INPUT FROM NATO.

(3) (U) CRITICAL ITEM MANAGEMENT: EXISTING REPORTS PROVIDE INADEQUATE INFORMATION TO UNIFIED COMMANDERS ON COMPONENT CRITICAL ITEMS OR SERVICE EFFORTS TO CORRECT SHORTFALLS. SINCE CINC CONTROLS THEATER PRIORITIES FOR BOTH MATERIEL AND LIFT, SUCH INFORMATION IS VITAL.

C. (U) EXECUTION MONITORING (REINFORCEMENT OF NATO CHOP OF FORCES, ROE, US/NATO ALERT SYSTEMS, OPLAN IMPLEMENTATION).

(1) (U) ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES: EACH NATO MSC (CINCS NORTH, CENT, AND SOUTH) REQUESTED REPLACEMENTS FOR DESTROYED SHIPS, AIRCRAFT, AND WEAPON SYSTEMS EITHER DIRECTLY TO CINCEUR OR TO SACEUR. SHAPE PASSED REQUIREMENTS TO CINCEUR WITHOUT ESTABLISHING ANY PRIORITY. DEMAND EXCEEDED AVAILABILITY. CONSEQUENTLY, WHEN SHAPE DID NOT ESTABLISH PRIORITIES FOR ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES, ALLOCATION FELL DE FACTO TO HQ USEUCOM. (THIS IS SIMILAR TO ITEM 3B(2) ABOVE).

(2) (U) CHOP OF FORCES TO NATO: USCINCEUR IS AUTHORIZED TO CHOP THOSE DEPLOYING FORCES LISTED IN THE ACE ORDER OF BATTLE (ORBAT) TO NATO. FORCES NOT LISTED REQUIRE SPECIFIC JCS/NCA APPROVAL TO CHOP. CURRENT EDITION OF ACE ORBAT CONTAINS OBSOLETE INFORMATION, AND MANY FORCES INTENDED FOR CHOP ARE NOT LISTED. TRANSFER OF THOSE FORCES TO NATO WAS TIME CONSUMING AND FRUSTRATED OUR ALLIES. JCS MUST UPDATE THE ACE ORBAT.

(3) (U) GRAVES REGISTRATION: GRAVES REGISTRATION PROGRAM WITHIN U.S. MILITARY IS INCAPABLE OF FUNCTIONING IN WARTIME. DURING EXERCISES, ALL SERVICES WERE UNABLE TO PROCESS THEIR DEAD. TEMPORARY BURIAL WAS APPROVED IMMEDIATELY, HOWEVER, ACTUAL MANPOWER AND MATERIAL TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION WAS NONEXISTENT. ADDITIONALLY, PROCESSING OF PERSONNEL EFFECTS WAS NEVER ADDRESSED.

D. (U) CIVIL-MILITARY INTERFACE (NEG, SA, HNS, LOG SUPPORT TO NATO).

(1) (U) NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEO): NEO PROCEDURES IN FRG WERE FULLY EXERCISED DOWN TO COMMUNITY LEVEL. MANY NEW ASPECTS WERE PLAYED, MOST OF WHICH WENT WELL WHEN ONLY U.S. ASSETS WERE USED. WHEN, HOWEVER, OUTBREAK OF WAR REQUIRED MOVEMENT THROUGH BELGIUM AND NETHERLANDS AND BY CARRIERS OF OPPORTUNITY, THERE WAS NO PROVISION OR PLAN FOR THIS EVOLUTION. PLANS NEED TO BE EXPANDED TO INCORPORATE FULL CAPABILITIES OF MSC, MAC, MTMC, AND ALLIED AGENCIES. ADDITIONALLY, BILATERAL NEO AGREEMENTS WITH APPROPRIATE HOST NATIONS SHOULD BE DEVELOPED.

(2) (U) PORT AMMUNITION RESTRICTIONS: U.S. SHIPS ARRIVED AT EUROPEAN PORTS CARRYING AMMUNITION TONNAGES IN EXCESS OF THAT ALLOWED IN POPULATED PORTS BY HOST NATIONS. LIMITATIONS PLACED ON ORDNANCE OFFLOAD AT PORTS NEEDS TO BE BASED ON WARTIME VICE PEACETIME REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDANCE SHOULD BE SPECIFIED IN NET EXPLOSIVE WEIGHT (NEW) VICE BULK LOAD.

(3) (U) NBC EQUIPMENT: SHORTFALL EXISTS THROUGHOUT THEATER FOR NBC CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT. ADDITIONAL ASSETS NEED TO BE PROCURED AND DISTRIBUTED.

E. (U) COMMUNICATIONS

(1) (U) AUTODIN BACKLOGS: INTERFACE BETWEEN HIGH-SPEED US AUTODIN SWITCHES AND LOW-SPEED NATO SYSTEMS CAUSED EXCESSIVE BACKLOGS AT AUTODIN SWITCHES. PROBLEM WAS PARTICULARLY ACUTE AT CROUGHTON, UK. UNTIL NATO TARE SYSTEM IS OPERATIONAL, RECOMMEND PREPOSITIONING HIGH-SPEED MOBILE TERMINAL EQUIPMENT AT SPECIFIED LOCATIONS WITHIN THEATER. THIS WOULD PROVIDE ON-CALL CAPABILITY TO RECEIVE TRAFFIC. OFFER OF ADDITIONAL AUTODIN TO NATO IS ALSO UNDER CONSIDERATION AS INTERIM MEASURE.

(2) (U) MINIMIZE EFFECTIVENESS: ALTHOUGH MINIMIZE WAS IMPOSED BY SEVERAL US AND NATO COMMANDERS, TRAFFIC VOLUME IN EUROPEAN THEATER WAS NOT NOTICEABLY AFFECTED. FOLLOW-UP ANALYSIS TO EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS OF MINIMIZE EFFORTS AND DETERMINE EVENTS WHICH NECESSITATE BT

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date

DEC 14 2012

ACTION 0315

(U, B, 7, F)

INFO C3CS(4) C3S(4) J1(1) NIDS(4) DODDIV(1) J3-NMCC(4)

J4(4) J5(2) C3S(5) COMMOFF(1) USCINCENTLO(1)

JDA:LO(1) JECG(5) SECDEF(9) USDP(15) ASD:MAAL(2)

NMCC(4)

+OMC CC WASHINGTON DC

SECTIONAL(1)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 50

Point Paper for the Director for Operations for the WINTEX-CIMEX 83 PXD at SHAPE on 22 March 1983.

I. SUBJECT: Message Rejection into NATO-Wide Communications System (NWCS).

II. PURPOSE: To discuss the extent and status of the message reject problem into the NWCS.

III. MAJOR POINTS

A. Main points:

- 251 of 522 (48 percent) messages manually input into the teletype circuit at the Pentagon Telecommunications Center (PTC) were rejected by the Evere Telegraph Automatic Relay Equipment (TARE) Belgium.

- Causes of WINTEX-CIMEX 83 PTC/TARE high reject rate, normally about 10 percent, are unknown; can be caused by improper formatting or errors introduced by equipments or circuits.

- The US Delegate to the Military Committee, Brussels, has recommended that Pentagon Consolidated Telecommunications System (PCTCS) personnel visit NATO Hqs at Evere to analyze the reject problem (TAB A); Mr. Marvin Owens, Pentagon Telecommunications Center, plans to visit if travel funds are made available.

B. Major Points other discussants may bring up:

- The high message reject rate is caused by US operators not following ACP (Allied Communications Policy) (TAB B).

Counterargument - Some of the rejects result from this non-compliance with ACP. However, the rigid reject features of the TARE switch will also cause rejects from errors introduced by circuits and equipments. The PTC doesn't get timely or adequate feedback from TARE switch personnel on the number and causes of message rejects. They have no means to determine the causes of rejects in WINTEX-CIMEX 83. Although PTC personnel plan visit NATO Hqs at Evere, copies of

all messages as received by the TARE switch during WINTEX-CIMEX 83 should be provided for analysis prior to the visit.

APPROVED BY

DIRECTOR, C3S

Prepared by:

C3S Evaluation Office  
Ext 76224

JS5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)

ATTACHMENTS

- TAB A - USDELMC message 141514Z Mar 83, "Real World Problem - Evere Telegraph Rejects", UNCLASSIFIED.
- TAB B - USDELMC message 281738Z Mar 83, "Real World Problem - Evere Telegraph Rejects", UNCLASSIFIED.

~~INTERNAL - STAFF PAPER~~

~~RELEASE COVERED BY ICS MOD 39~~

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Date: DEC 14 2012

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

ROUTINE  
R 141514Z MAR 83  
FM USDELHC BRUSSELS BE  
TO DA WASHDC//DAMO-CAS-C//  
CDR USACC OPS COMD WASHDC//CONK-C//  
OIC PCTCS WASHDC  
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC//C3I// JCS WASHDC//C3S//  
CDR USACC FT HUACHUCA AZ//CC-OPS//  
CDR 7THSIGCOM FT RITCHIE MD//CC-OP//  
CUSAACCLM WASHDC//CC-LMOM// ZEN/USMISSION USNATO/POUCH

UNCLAS BRUSSELS BE 01775

CITE: 217/83

SUBJECT: REAL WORLD PROBLEM-EVERE TELEGRAPH REJECTS

REFERENCES: A. USDELHC 281738Z FEB 83 (NOTAL)  
B. DA 081518Z MAR 83 (NOTAL)

1. REF A, INTER ALIA, IDENTIFIED A REAL WORLD COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEM AND PROVIDED INFORMATION ABOUT U.S. RECEIVED MESSAGE TRAFFIC AND REJECTS AT THE EVERE LOCATION FOR THE FIRST FOUR DAYS OF EXERCISE WINTEX-CIMEX 83. REF B, INTER ALIA, ACKNOWLEDGED RECEIPT OF REF A AND ADVISED THAT ADDITIONAL MEASURES HAD BEEN TAKEN TO INSURE THAT U.S. MESSAGES COMPLY WITH THE NATO-WIDE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (NWCS) FORMAT.

2. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING U.S. MESSAGE TRAFFIC ENTERING THE NWCS IS FURNISHED BELOW FOR THE REMAINDER OF EXERCISE WINTEX-CIMEX 83:

MSGS RECD:	NO. OF REJECTS:	DATE:
-		28 FEB 83 (1)
- 39	15	1 MAR 83
- 35	7	2 MAR 83
- 40	12	3 MAR 83
- 40	18	4 MAR 83
- 45	24	5 MAR 83
- 35	29	6 MAR 83
- 47	20	7 MAR 83
- 42	22	8 MAR 83
- 24	12	9 MAR 83

(1) NOTE: DUE TO MALFUNCTION OF THE TARE EQUIPMENT THE NUMBER OF NWCS RECEIVED MESSAGES WAS NOT CAPTURED; BUT, DATA FOR REJECTED MESSAGES IS KNOWN. THE U.S. MESSAGE REJECTS TOTALLED 28 FOR THIS DAY.

3. THE ABOVE DATA REVEALS:

- A. THAT THE U.S. MESSAGE REJECT RATE FOR THE FIRST FOUR EXERCISE DAYS, USING THE NWCS, WAS 52 PERCENT.
- B. EXCLUDING 28 FEB 83 (DUE TO INCOMPLETE DATA) THE U.S. MESSAGE REJECT RATE FOR THE REMAINING NINE DAYS WAS 45 PERCENT.
- C. THE TOTAL NUMBER OF NWCS MESSAGES RECEIVED OVER THE WASHINGTON CIRCUIT WAS 522.
- D. THE TOTAL NUMBER OF MESSAGES REJECTED WAS 251, EQUATING TO AN OVERALL U.S. MESSAGE REJECT RATE (EXCLUDING 28 FEB) OF 48 PERCENT.

4. DURING EXERCISE WINTEX-CIMEX 83 LIAISON WAS MAINTAINED DAILY BETWEEN USDELHC AND THE CHIEF OF THE NATO SITUATION CENTRE, WHO MANAGES THE OPERATION OF THE NATO COMMUNICATIONS CENTER. AFTER RECEIVING REFERENCE B, WE REVIEWED AND DISCUSSED THE RECOMMENDATION CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 3

THEREOF. WE JOINTLY CONSIDER IT MORE ADVANTAGEOUS THAT A PCTCS REPRESENTATIVE VISIT NATO HQS-EVERE WHERE WE CAN SIT DOWN TOGETHER AND GO OVER THE HARD COPY EXAMPLES OF THE U.S. MESSAGES AND SPECIFICALLY FOCUS ON WHAT CAUSED THE VARIOUS REJECTS AND DISCUSS IN DETAIL NATO MESSAGE FORMAT REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES. ON OCCASION IN THE PAST, WE HAVE PROVIDED (UNOFFICIALLY) THE HARD COPY OF U.S. EXERCISE TRAFFIC FOR PCTCS USE/ANALYSIS. THE RESULTS HAVE BEEN LESS THAN SATISFACTORY DUE TO VARIOUS REASONS (E.G., TURNOVER OF U.S. OPERATOR PERSONNEL AND MINIMAL USE OF THE NWCS WASHINGTON/EVERE CIRCUIT, EXCEPT DURING MAJOR NATO EXERCISES WHERE WASHINGTON WAS PARTICIPATING).

5. USDELHC WILL BE PLEASED TO COORDINATE A MUTUALLY AGREEABLE DATE FOR A JOINT MEETING AND SUGGEST A ONE-DAY OR PERHAPS TWO-DAY MEETING WOULD BE ADEQUATE. REQUEST THAT YOU ASCERTAIN IF OUR ABOVE MENTIONED RECOMMENDATION CAN BE AGREED.

6. THIS IS A JOINT USDELHC/USMISSION USNATO MESSAGE. BT

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Date: DEC 14 2012

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

ROUTINE  
R 281738Z FEB 83  
FM USDELHC BRUSSELS BE  
TO DA WASHDC//DAMO-C45-C// PRIORITY  
OIC USACC PTC WASHDC PRIORITY  
CDR USACC OPS COMD WASHDC PRIORITY  
INFO COM7THSFGOM FT RITCHIE MD//CC-OP//  
RUMOHFE/CDR USACC FT HUACHUCA FT HUACHUCA  
A2//CC-OPS// JCS WASHDC//C33//  
SECDEF WASHDC//C31// SECSTATE WASHDC  
ZEN/USMISSION USNATO POUCH

UNCLAS BRUSSELS BE 01350

CITE: 184/83

SUBJECT: REAL WORLD PROBLEM-EVERE TELEGRAPH REJECTS

REFERENCE: CONCERN BETWEEN MAJ JOHNSON (OJCS, C3S RESPONSE CELL REP FOR EXER WINTEX/CIMEX 83) AND COL TAYLOR, USDELHC, ON 28 FEB 83

1. DURING REF CONVERSATION A REAL WORLD COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEM WAS HIGHLIGHTED: NAMELY, THE HIGH REJECT RATE OF U.S. TRAFFIC ENTERING THE NATO-WIDE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (NWCS) NETWORK FROM THE WASHINGTON DC TERMINAL LOCATED IN THE PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER.

2. THE USDEL WAS ADVISED BY THE OIC, NATO COMMUNICATIONS CENTER, OF SOME OF THE STATISTICS FOR THE EVERE TELEGRAPH AUTOMATIC RELAY EQUIPMENT (TARE) RELATING TO THE U.S. RECEIVED NWCS RECORD MESSAGE TRAFFIC (DURING EXER WINTEX/CIMEX 83). THIS INFO IS SHOWN BELOW:

MSGS RECD:	NO. OF REJECTS:	SELECTED DATES:
- 53	24	24 FEB 83
- 45	21	25 FEB 83
- 44	25	26 FEB 83
- 32	22	27 FEB 83

THE ABOVE REJECT RATES ARE EXTREMELY HIGH WHICH CAUSES U.S. ORIGINATED MESSAGE TRAFFIC NOT REPEAT NOT BEING RECEIVED IN A TIMELY MANNER AND IMPACTS ADVERSELY ON THE EXERCISE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT AT NATO HQS.

3. THE ABOVE MESSAGES WERE REJECTED BECAUSE U.S. OPERATORS ARE NOT FOLLOWING THE ACP (ALLIED COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURE) 127, NATO SUPP-3 AS SUPPLEMENTED BY COMCEN-143-31 (OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR THE MESSAGE SWITCHING CAPABILITY OF THE NATO-WIDE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (NWCS) EDITION IN USE IN THE NWCS. THESE PARTICULAR PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN DISSEMINATED TO THE NWCS TERMINALS.

4. THE EVERE TARE USES A REAL TIME WORKING COMPUTER IN ORDER TO PROCESS THE INCOMING TRAFFIC. THE TARE ANALYZES EACH INCOMING MESSAGE IN A VERY STRICT BUT LOGICAL MANNER, WATCHING CLOSELY AT EACH DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS IN ITS PROGRAM AND THE RECEIVED SIGNALS EITHER IN THE HEADING OR IN THE TEXT. IF DURING THE PROCESS, THE TARE DETECTS DISCREPANCIES, IT WILL REJECT THE MESSAGE AND STORE IT IN A SEPARATE PART OF ITS MEMORY WITHOUT ANY FURTHER LOOK AT THE PRECEDENCE. IN ITS TURN THE REJECT WILL BE EXTRACTED OUT OF THAT MEMORY AND WILL BE PRINTED OUT ON A TELETYPE MACHINE AT THE SUPERVISOR POSITION. AT THIS TIME THE TARE SUPERVISOR TAKES ONE OF THE TWO FOLLOWING ACTIONS:

- A. INFORMS THE ORIGINATING TERMINAL ABOUT THE REJECTION AND REQUESTS THAT TERMINALS CORRECT AND RETRANSMIT THE MESSAGE.


- B. CORRECTS THE MESSAGE AND REINTRODUCES IT IN THE SYSTEM. THIS APPLIES ONLY TO INCOMING TRAFFIC.

5. THE CRITICALITY OF ADHERING TO THE ACCURATE USE OF ACP 127, NATO SUPP-3 FORMAT CANNOT BE EMPHASIZED ENOUGH. TO FACILITATE TIMELY MESSAGE FLOW OF TRAFFIC FROM THE WASHINGTON AREA, IT IS URGENTLY REQUESTED THAT YOU TAKE THE NECESSARY CORRECTIVE ACTION TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF REJECTED MESSAGES (I.E., INCREASE OPERATOR AWARENESS AND CORRECTIVE TRAINING ON THE CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS AND RIGID REJECT FEATURES OF THE TARE SWITCH; AND, SUPERVISE OPERATOR PERSONNEL BY PLACING ADDITIONAL EMPHASIS ON QUALITY CONTROL TO ENSURE THAT PROCEDURAL AND FORMAT ERRORS ARE MINIMIZED).

6. REQUEST ADVISE.  
7. THIS IS JOINT USDELHC/USMISSION NATO MESSAGE. BT

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Date:

DEC 14 2012



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: DEC 14 2012

5 April 1983

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR C3S EVALUATION OFFICE

Attention: [REDACTED]

JS 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (6)

Subject: WINTEX 83

1. Reference notes on: WINTEX 83 Senior Level First Impressions Conference, 22 March 1983.
2. The following is submitted to assist in the drafting of a response to reference.
3. NATO interoperability is hindered by the need for data security differences in national military force structure, doctrine, and tactics; historical and geographic dissimilarities; and political and economic conditions which strongly affect military matters in the areas of international cooperation and dependence. Moreover, NATO cannot dictate standards and cooperation since participation in NATO by its autonomous members is voluntary and agreement is by consensus. NATO organizations and committees can only recommend, persuade, and coordinate.
4. Interoperability with NATO can be further hampered by incompatibilities with US interoperability standards and procedures. Major initiatives addressing NATO interoperability are:
  - a. NATO Rationalization/Standardization/Interoperability (R/S/I). This program exhorts the efficient use of what is available, and encourages standards in equipment and procedures, integration of forces and tactics where possible, and balanced and compatible force structures. These objectives, extended to NATO command and control, seek common design and procurement of systems, standards for intersystem operations and procedures, and complementary national capabilities.
  - b. Command and control cooperation in development and procurement. The Conference on NATO Armaments Development, the highest NATO monitor and advisor of cooperative development, is concerned with compatible and interoperable command and control systems. Although cooperative NATO procurement need not necessarily mean common equipment, which may be undesirable due to national differences in equipment replacement schedules and other factors, it can result in reduced or shared acquisition costs; reduced wartime logistics, maintenance, and training problems; and compliance with interface standards. Major systems procurements planned or coordinated by NATO, e.g., NAEW&C, CAMPS, ACE ACCIS,

and the emerging Air Command and Control System (ACCS) initiative, demonstrate this trend, and focus on solving the pressing problems of NATO-national command and control compatibility and interoperability.

c. Non-NATO multi-national organizations concerned with communications and information exchange also contribute to NATO interoperability or to a conducive European infrastructure. The European Common Market has adopted the International Consultative Committee on Telegraphy and Telephony (CCITT) recommended X.25 protocol for packet switching communications, and is recommending adoption by its six member nations of Ada as a common ADP applications language. The Independent European Planning Group, which is the association of the European nations within NATO, has many military panels which pursue cooperation and standards, and the joint design and production of families of systems. An example of a specially convened ad hoc effort was the Multifunctional Information Distribution Systems study group, consisting of military and industry representatives whose examination of electronic countermeasures (ECM) resistant tactical communications (including maritime and IFF) should lead to a much needed NATO STANAG.


SS 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)



Colonel, USA  
Chief, Interoperability  
Division

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IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: DEC 14 2012






**IMRNEWFILE**

Office of the Secretary of Defense 50 USC 8552  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 14 DEC 2012 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 12-M-1493

WINTEX



CIMEX

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 14 2012


FIRST IMPRESSIONS  
CONFERENCE

JED 305

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12-M-1493 (#2)

WINTEX



CIMEX


# AGENDA

- o OPENING REMARKS
- o EXERCISE OVERVIEW
- o CONTROLLER FIRST IMPRESSIONS
- o SELECTED CINC COMMENTS
- o CHIEF CONTROLLER COMMENTS
- o SENIOR PLAYER FIRST IMPRESSIONS

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WINTEX



CIMEX

WINTEX-CIMEX


# OBJECTIVE AREAS

- DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES
- EXECUTION MONITORING
  - CHOP OF FORCES
  - RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)
  - ALERT SYSTEMS
  - OPLAN IMPLEMENTATION
- SELECTIVE RELEASE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
- CRISIS MANAGEMENT
  - OJCS — OSD INTERFACE

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WINTEX




WINTEX-CIVEX

# OBJECTIVE AREAS (CONT)

- CIVIL-MILITARY INTERFACE
  - NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION (NEO)
  - SECURITY ASSISTANCE
  - HOST NATION SUPPORT
  - LOGISTIC SUPPORT & SUSTAINABILITY
- WWMCCS ADP
- SPACE OPERATIONS
- COMMUNICATIONS

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
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## PARTICIPATION

- NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
  - CRISIS PREPLANNING GROUP (CPPG)
- STATE DEPARTMENT
- DOD
  - OSD
  - JCS
  - CINCS
  - SERVICES
  - DEFENSE AGENCIES
  - TRANSPORTATION OPERATING AGENCIES
- NSA
- FEMA
- CIVIL AGENCIES

WINTER




PRE-STARVEX SCENARIO

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

- o INCREASED MILITARY PREPAREDNESS — 1982
- o LEADERSHIP CHANGE — JUN 1982
- o LARGE-SCALE EXERCISES — JAN 1983
- o HARASSMENT OF BLUE MERCHANT SHIPS — JAN 1983
- o BLOC MOBILIZED — JAN 1983
- o SWA CRISIS — FEB 1983

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

*PRE-STARTEX SCENARIO*

**BLUE**

- U.S. INDUSTRIAL BASE EXPANDED — JAN 82
- MILITARY VIGILANCE — 31 JAN 83
- DPC — REINFORCE EUROPE — 1 FEB 83
- U.S. NATIONAL EMERGENCY — 3 FEB 83
- U.S. FULL MOBILIZATION — 5 FEB 83
- U.S. REINFORCEMENT OF EUROPE — 5 FEB 83




WINNEX  
STARTEX CRISIS AREAS



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WINNEX



24-26 FEB


# TOPICS / EVENTS

- o ORANGE SSBN AND BOMBER DEPLOYMENTS
- o AMVACS AUGMENTATION REQUESTS
- o NATO REQUESTS CARRIER BATTLE GROUP AUGMENTATION
- o NORAD REQUESTS EXECUTION OF OPLANS FOR AIR DEFENSE OF NORTH AMERICA
- o PACOM REQUESTS RETENTION OF AMPHIBS

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WINTEX



CIVEX


# ACTIONS / CONSIDERATIONS

24-26 FEB

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Date: DEC 14 2012

- o CANADIAN CONSULTATIONS — NORAD DEFCON 3
- o AWACS ALLOCATION REAFFIRMED
- o PACOM CARRIER BATTLE GROUP DEPLOYED TO ATLANTIC
- o EXECUTION — OPLAN FOR AIP DEFENSE OF NORTH AMERICA
- o NAVY SUPPORTS PACOM AMPHIB RETENTION

WINTEX



27 FEB - 1 MAR

# TOPICS/EVENTS


- NATO SIMPLE ALERT
- PACOM AMPHIB RETENTION
- NORAD REQUESTS AUGMENTATION FOR AIR DEFENSE OF NORTH AMERICA
- PACOM REQUESTS NEAR TERM PRE-POSITIONED FORCE MOVE
- USDELMC REQUESTS ROE 511 FOR MARITIME EXCLUSION AREA ESTABLISHMENT
- THREAT TO ALASKA

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WINNTEX

27 FEB - 1 MAR




# ACTIONS / CONSIDERATIONS

- DEFOON 2 WORLDWIDE
- AMPHIBS DEPLOYED TO NATO
- AUGMENTATION FOR AIR DEFENSE OF NORTH AMERICA DEFERRED
- NEAR TERM PRE-POSITIONED FORCE MOVE DEFERRED
- ROE 511 FOR MARITIME EXCLUSION AREAS DISAPPROVED
- ALASKAN AIR DEFENSE APPROVED

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Date: DEC 14 2012

WINTER




2 - 4 MAR

# TOPIC/EVENTS

- THREAT IN PACIFIC TO U.S. AND NON-NATO ALLIES
- NATO REINFORCED ALERT
- INCREASED ORANGE THREAT IN INDIAN OCEAN
- INCREASED THREAT TO NORTH AMERICA
- ORANGE ATTACKS NATO-WIDE
- NATO GENERAL ALERT

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WINTEX



# ACTIONS/CONSIDERATIONS


2 - 4 MAR

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Date: DEC 14 2012

- o CINCPAC PACIFIC DEFENSE OPLAN EXECUTED
- o DEFCON 1 WORLDWIDE
- o NEAR TERM PRE-POSITIONED FORCE TO GUAM
- o AUGMENTATION FOR AIR DEFENSE OF NORTH AMERICA EXECUTED
- o U.S. APPROVES GENERAL ALERT
- o U.S. DECLARATION OF WAR - ORANGE

~~SECRET~~

WINTEX



CIMEX

5 -- 7 MAR


# TOPIC/EVENTS

- o ORANGE BLOC CONTINUES ATTACK
- o USCINCSO REQUESTS AUGMENTATION
- o AWACS AUGMENTATION REQUESTED
- o CARRIER BATTLE GROUP AUGMENTATION REQUESTED
- o HARRASSMENT OF GUANTANAMO
- o SACEUR INITIAL NUCLEAR REQUEST





WINTEX




5 -- 7 MAR

# ACTIONS / CONSIDERATIONS

- o U.S. DECLARATION OF WAR -- ORANGE BLOC
- o INFANTRY BATTALION DEPLOYED TO PANAMA
- o AWACS REALLOCATED
- o CARRIER BATTLE GROUP AUGMENTATION UNCHANGED
- o ALERT ORDER -- OPERATIONS AGAINST CUBA
- o MCA APPROVAL -- SACEUR'S INITIAL NUCLEAR REQUEST

~~SECRET~~

WINTEX



8 - 9 MAR


# TOPIC/EVENTS

- o CONTINUED ORANGE CHEMICAL USE
- o SACEUR'S FOLLOW-ON NUCLEAR REQUEST

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WINNTEX




8 - 9 MAP

# ACTIONS / CONSIDERATIONS

- o MOVEMENT OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS APPROVED
- o NCA APPROVAL - SACEUR FOLLOW-ON NUCLEAR REQUEST

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


WINNEX  
CONTROLER  
FIRST IMPRESSIONS

- DEPLOYMENT
- EXECUTION MONITORING
- SELECTIVE RELEASE
- CRISIS MANAGEMENT
- CIVIL-MILITARY INTERFACE
- WWMCCS ADP
- SPACE OPERATIONS
- COMMUNICATIONS

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
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
WINTEX-CIMEX EXERCISE  
 DESIGN COMPARISON

	1978	1981	1983
SEPARATE U.S. EXERCISE	YES	YES	NO
DURATION	18 DAYS	13 DAYS	14 DAYS
SCENARIO	24 HRS/DAY	24 HRS/DAY	24 HRS/DAY
	SEPARATE U.S. GLOBAL CRISIS	REINFORCEMENT OF EUROPE	GLOBAL CRISES
OPPLANS	4102/2200	MULTIPLE	MULTIPLE
WARFIGHTING	YES	YES	YES
SPACE OPERATIONS	NO	NO	YES
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT	YES	YES	YES
NUCLEAR CONSULTATIONS	YES	YES	YES
CANADIAN CONSULTATIONS	NO	NO	YES

~~SECRET~~



# METHODS OF COMPARISON




- SEVERE PROBLEM — NEGLIGIBLE IMPROVEMENT
- PROBLEM — SOME IMPROVEMENT
- PROBLEM — SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT
- NOT ANALYZED

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WINTEX


FIRST IMPRESSIONS



# JOINT DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM

- o LIMITED PLAY
- o FIXED TRANSPORTATION FLOW — EUROPEAN REINFORCEMENT OPLAN
- o SEVEN OPLANS IN DATA BASE
- o PROBLEMS:
  - o NO-PLAN RESPONSIVENESS

WINTEX



# JOINT DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM


## FIRST IMPRESSIONS

### STATUS OF OPLANS IN JDS DATA BASE AT ENDX

PLAN	C DAY	MOVEMENT
USCJCEUR 4022X	5 FEB	IN PROGRESS
CINCLANT 2083X	5 FEB	IN PROGRESS
CINCPAC 3000	26 FEB	COMPLETE
3000W	26 FEB	COMPLETE
3000W	3 MARCH	COMPLETE
CINCPAC 5081X	4 MARCH	IN PROGRESS
USCJCEUR 103WC	TO BE DESIGNATED	

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




TREND ANALYSIS

JOINT DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM

	1979	1981	1983
TRANSPORTATION FLOW	POWER PLAY	POLL STATION	WINTEX-CIMEX
PLANNING	RED	GREEN	GREEN
DATA BASE MANAGEMENT	-	YELLOW	GREEN
NO-PLAN RESPONSIVENESS	-	RED	YELLOW




FIRST IMPRESSIONS

EXECUTION MONITORING


- o ROE
  - o MARITIME EXCLUSION AREAS
  - o IMPROPER CHOP
  - o U.S./NATO ALERT SYSTEMS
  - o SITUATION MONITORING

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
FIRST IMPRESSIONS  
ALERTS

NATO ALERT SYSTEM



U.S. ALERT SYSTEM

~~SECRET~~




# EXECUTION MONITORING

## TREND ANALYSIS

	1979	1981	1983
○ ROE	YELLOW	YELLOW	YELLOW
○ CHOP OF FORCES			
○ TRIMELINESS	YELLOW	YELLOW	YELLOW
○ UNAUTHORIZED	YELLOW	RED	YELLOW
○ ALERT PROCEDURES	YELLOW	YELLOW	GREEN
○ SITUATION MONITORING	YELLOW	RED	RED

WINTEX




FIRST IMPRESSIONS

SELECTIVE RELEASE

- o SECURE VOICE INADEQUATE
- o EARLY CONSULTATION EXPECTED
- o PROCEDURES:
  - o MODIFICATION OF SACEUR NUCLEAR REQUEST IMPROPER
  - o "COMMUNICATING NATO INTENTIONS"(CNI) PROCEDURES NOT FORMALIZED
- o POST STRIKE RECONNAISSANCE

~~SECRET~~

WINTEX



TREND ANALYSIS


# SELECTIVE RELEASE

	1979	1981	1983
SECURE VOICE	RED	RED	RED
CONSULTATION	RED	LIMITED PLAY	YELLOW
PROCEDURES	RED	RED	RED
POST STRIKE RECON	RED	RED	RED
POWER PLAY		WINTEX-STATION	CIMEX

~~SECRET~~

WIMTEX


FIRST IMPRESSIONS



# CIMEX CRISIS MANAGEMENT

- o NATO - U.S. SECURE VOICE INADEQUATE
- o OJCS CRISIS ACTION TEAM PROCEDURES
- o OSD - OJCS COORDINATION
  - o CRISIS COORDINATION GROUP PROVIDED OSD FOCAL POINT
- o USBELMIC AGENDA DEADLINES
- o TIME DIFFERENCES
- o STATE DEPARTMENT PARTICIPATION
- o DECLARATION OF WAR CONFUSED NATO

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TREND ANALYSIS


CRISIS MANAGEMENT

	1979 POWER PLAY	1981 POLL STATION	1983 WINTEX- CIMEX
○ NATO-U.S. SECURE VOICE	RED	RED	RED
○ OJCS CRISIS ACTION TEAM PROCEDURES	YELLOW	YELLOW	YELLOW
○ OSD — OJCS COORDINATION	RED	RED	GREEN
○ TIME DIFFERENCES	—	—	—
○ STATE DEPARTMENT PARTICIPATION	RED	RED	RED
○ DECLARATION OF WAR	—	RED	RED



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WINTEX




FIRST IMPRESSIONS

NEO

- o EXTENSIVE EUROPEAN PLAY
- o LIMITED U.S. RECEPTION PLAY
- o LACK TRANSIT RIGHTS & SAFEHAVENS
- o NEED CENTRAL CLEARING HOUSE

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WINTEX




FIRST IMPRESSIONS

# SECURITY ASSISTANCE

- NATO MUTUAL SUPPORT ACT — 1979
  - RESTRICTIVE LEGISLATION
  - NO STANDBY LEGISLATIVE RELIEF
- FMS/GRANT AID DIVERSIONS
- GUIDANCE NOT TIMELY

WINTER



FIRST IMPRESSIONS

# SUSTAINABILITY

- o SUSTAINABILITY INADEQUATE
- o INSUFFICIENT WAR RESERVE STOCKS
- o INDUSTRIAL BASE SURGE
- o NO NEAR-TERM RELIEF

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
TREND ANALYSIS

CIMEX CIVIL — MILITARY INTERFACE

	1979 POWER PLAY	1981 POLL STATION	1983 WINTEX- CIMEX
● NEO	RED	RED	YELLOW
● SECURITY ASSISTANCE	RED	RED	RED
● LOGISTIC SUSTAINABILITY	RED	RED	RED

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WINTEX




FIRST IMPRESSIONS


WWW/MIGGS ADP

- HARDWARE/SOFTWARE RELIABILITY GREATLY IMPROVED
- SOME FILE TRANSFER PROBLEMS
- WIN TELECONFERENCING EXTENSIVE


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# WIN NETWORK RELIABILITY



WINTEX



TREND ANALYSIS

# WWWJGGS ADP


- HARDWARE & SOFTWARE
- RELIABILITY
- DATA FILE TRANSFER
- WIN TELECONFERENCING

	1979	1981	1983
	POWER	POLL	WINTEX-
	PLAY	STATION	CIMEX

	RED	RED	GREEN
	RED	RED	YELLOW
	YELLOW	YELLOW	GREEN

~~SECRET~~

WINTEK



FIRST IMPRESSIONS

# SPACE OPERATIONS


- o SABOTAGE: SATELLITE CONTROL FACILITY, SUNNYVALE
- o THEATER USE OF NATIONAL ASSETS

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WINNTEX




FIRST IMPRESSIONS

# COMMUNICATIONS

- o U.S. NATO COMMUNICATIONS
- o SOME IMPACT FROM DEGRADES
- o INADEQUATE NATO SYSTEMS
- o OPSECC WEAKNESSES

~~SECRET~~

WINTEX



TREND ANALYSIS


# COMMUNICATIONS

- U.S.-NATO COMMUNICATIONS
- OPSEC

1979	1981	1983
POWER PLAY	POLL STATION	WINTEX-CIMEX
RED	RED	RED
YELLOW	RED	RED

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WINNEMUK



CIVEX

# U.S. MISSION NATO


## FIRST IMPRESSIONS

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- o SCENARIO DID NOT STRESS CIVIL AGENCIES
- o EXERCISE WOULD HAVE BENEFITED FROM MORE POLITICAL INPUTS FROM WASHINGTON AND MORE TIMELY RESPONSE FROM WASHINGTON TO POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS
- o NATIONS DO NOT UNDERSTAND:
  - o MARITIME EXCLUSION AREAS
  - o RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
- o U.S. NUCLEAR PLAY CAUSED CONFUSION

WINTEX


FIRST IMPRESSIONS



# USDELMIC BRUSSELS

- o MARITIME ROE GUIDANCE NOT CONSISTENT WITH REAL WORLD U.S. POSITION
- o USDELMIC REQUIRES BETTER INFORMATION ON DISPOSITION OF U.S. FORCES WORLDWIDE
- o U.S. AWACS NOT PROPERLY USED BY NATO (USED AS AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING - NOT FIGHTER CONTROL)
- o NUCLEAR CONSULTATION EVENTS TRANSMITTED TO OUR ALLIES A STATE OF CONFUSION AND 'POSSIBLE LACK OF ADEQUATE CONTROL ON NUCLEAR PROCEDURES'

WINTEX




FIRST IMPRESSIONS

COMPLAINANT

- o COMMAND CENTER PERSONNEL NEED MORE FAMILIARITY WITH U.S./NATO INTERFACE
- o CHOP OF FORCES TO NATO AND ROE LED TO SOME MISUNDERSTANDINGS
- o MARITIME EXCLUSION AREAS HAVE VALUE IF SIZE AND SCOPE ARE SUCH THAT THEY ARE ENFORCEABLE
- o STOCKS OF 'SMART' WEAPONS ARE INADEQUATE EVEN WITH 12 MONTHS SURGE
- o ADVANCED BASE FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT AT CONTINGENCY SITES
- o LACK OF NBC KITS RESULTED IN MASS CASUALTIES IN ICELAND

WINTEK



FIRST IMPRESSIONS

## USCINCEUR


- DIFFICULTY TRACKING HIGH PRIORITY CARGO
- REPLIES TO REQUESTS FOR LOGISTIC ASSISTANCE IN EUROPE WERE NOT TIMELY UNLESS THE ITEM WAS SURPLUS
- RESOURCE ALLOCATION AMONG MAJOR NATO COMMANDS TO REPLACE COMBAT LOSSES REQUIRES PRIORITIZATION BY NATO
- ACE ONEAT REQUIRES UPDATING
- NEO FROM FRG WENT WELL — BILATERAL AGREEMENTS FOR BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS ARE NEEDED
- SHORTFALL OF NBC EQUIPMENT THROUGHOUT THEATER
- EXCESSIVE MESSAGE BACKLOGS AT AUTODIN SWITCHES
- DOD POLICY ON RETENTION OF ESSENTIAL CIVILIANS IS NEEDED

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WINTEX




FIRST IMPRESSIONS

GENCMAAC

- EUROPEAN THEATER COMMUNICATIONS INADEQUATE TO SUPPORT INTRATHEATER LIFT
  - SLOW
  - NOT SECURE
  - INSUFFICIENT
- ADHERENCE TO AIRLIFT PROCEDURES IMPROVED GREATLY
- SHORT NOTICE JOBS EXECUTE ORDERS RESTRICT TIMELY SCHEDULING OF MISSIONS
- MISUNDERSTANDING EXISTS IN DEPLOYMENT COMMUNITY OVER ACQUISITION OF NATO AND U.S. CIVILIAN AIRLIFT ASSETS
- CLOSURE ESTIMATING DIFFICULT WHEN AIRLIFT ALLOCATION IS UNCERTAIN OR SIZE OF FORCE IS UNKNOWN

WINTEX



CINEX


FIRST IMPRESSIONS

CINCPAC

- o REQUIREMENT TO AUGMENT CINCLANT DIMINISHES CINCPAC'S CAPABILITY TO PERFORM MISSION REQUIREMENTS OF JSCP AND DEFENSE GUIDANCE
- o FORCE ALLOCATION DECISIONS SHOULD BE MADE DURING ACTIVE EXERCISE PLAY
- o ENCOURAGE GREATER EMBASSY PLAY TO EFFECT POLITICO/MILITARY INTERFACE
- o "SMART" ORDNANCE INSUFFICIENT



WINTEX



COMDEX


USCINCPAC/PJ/JDA

FIRST IMPRESSIONS

- UNREALISTIC READINESS STATUS AND ARRIVAL AT THE POD ON LAD DID NOT ALLOW EXAMINATION OF LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS/SHORTFALLS
- LIMITED CAPABILITY TO IDENTIFY QUICKLY RESIDUAL CONUS FORCES
- WINNOCs WAS RESPONSIVE
- JTR DID NOT ALWAYS PROVIDE TIMELY STRATEGIC LIFT ALLOCATIONS
- JDC CONFUSED ON PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING A NO-PLAN DATA BASE

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DEC 14 2012




*FIRST IMPRESSIONS*

**CINCSAC**

- ⊙ SUPPORT PACKAGES AND SPECIAL FUELS FOR SAC RECON AIRCRAFT NOT CONSIDERED BY USCINCEUR AND JCS PRIOR TO DISPERSAL OF AIRCRAFT
- ⊙ POST STRIKE RECONNAISSANCE NOT REQUESTED BY EUCOM
- ⊙ AREAS REQUIRING FURTHER STUDY:
  - B-52 TARGET SELECTION
  - TANKER SURVIVAL IN EUCOM THEATER

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WINTEX




## MAJOR ISSUES

- o PACOM AUGMENTATION OF NATO
- o EMPLOYMENT OF CARRIER BATTLE GROUP IN INDIAN OCEAN
- o USE OF HEAVY TERNI PRE-POSITIONED FORCE
- o NATO RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
- o NUCLEAR RELEASE PROCEDURES
- o NEUTRALIZATION OF CUBA

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
CHIEF CONTROLLER COMMENTS

# MAJOR CONCERNS

- o SECURE COMMUNICATIONS TO NATO
- o PLAYERS REACTED TO CURRENT SITUATION WITHOUT LOOKING AHEAD
- o EXERCISE NOT USED BY STATE DEPARTMENT AND SENIOR OFFICIALS AS A TRAINING VEHICLE
- o PROCEDURES ASSOCIATED WITH THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
- o EXERCISE TOO LONG AND INFLEXIBLE

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
WINTEX



CHIEF CONTROLLER COMMENTS

# MAJOR PROGRESSES

- o OSD CRISIS COORDINATION GROUP
- o OJCS CRISIS ACTION SYSTEM
- o IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH GLOBAL WAR STARTING IN EUROPE
- o PLAYER ACTION BY SACEUR ON SECOND NUCLEAR RELEASE MESSAGE
- o GOOD TEST OF NATO PLANS AND PROCEDURES




# PRESSURE POINT 84

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Date: DEC 14 2012

- o TYPE: WORLD CRISIS CPX
- o DATES: 16-22 NOVEMBER 1983 (PROPOSED)
- o OBJECTIVE: TEST FORCE MODULE CONCEPT AND SUSTAINABILITY  
IN A MAJOR CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT
- o SCENARIO: C + 30 DAYS INTO KOREAN WAR. CONTINGENCIES IN  
CENTRAL AMERICA AND AFRICA.

~~SECRET~~


WINTER



FIRST IMPRESSIONS

# SEQUENCE OF COMMENTS

DEPUTY SECDEF	COAST GUARD
DUSD (POLICY)	ADCCM/NORAD
STATE	CINCCENT
NSC	J-4, J-5, G3S, J-1
FEWMA	MSC
ARMY	MTMC
NAVY	DJS
AIR FORCE	
MARINE CORPS	



*FIRST IMPRESSIONS*

CINCAD/NORAD

- WIN ACCESS FOR FIRST TIME PERMITTED TELECONFERENCING WITH JDA, MTMC AND MAC
- COMMAND CENTER RECEIVED EXCELLENT PLAY FROM NEW SPACE AND AIR ACTIVITY CONFERENCES
- IMPLEMENTATION OF OPLANS/CONPLANS REALISTICALLY EXERCISED PROCEDURES AND HIGHLIGHTED:
  - SHORTAGE OF AIR TO AIR MUNITIONS
  - LACK OF ADEQUATE ADA/E-3A/FIGHTER RESOURCES
- NUCLEAR WEAPONS RELEASE PROCEDURES WERE COMPLETE AND WELL PLAYED
- EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS RESTORAL PROCEDURES SHOULD REMAIN A MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF JCS EXERCISES